

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANDRES E. BRYAN,

Plaintiff,

-against-

FLEETBANK, N.A.; DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, TAMPA, FLORIDA,

Defendants.

21-CV-5054 (LTS)

TRANSFER ORDER

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing *pro se*, bring this action alleging that Defendants violated his rights in Brooklyn, New York. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

DISCUSSION

Under the general venue provision, a civil action may be brought in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1). A defendant corporation generally resides “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . ” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Where a state has more than one judicial district, a defendant corporation generally “shall be deemed to reside in any district

in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).¹

Plaintiff, who resides in Brooklyn, New York, alleges that he entered a contest with American Family Publishers (AFP), and AFP notified Plaintiff that he was the only winner of an \$11,000,000.00 prize that was deposited in Fleet Bank in Tampa, Florida. Plaintiff asserts that APF instructed the bank to release the prize check to Plaintiff at 83 Irving Avenue, B-Level, Brooklyn, New York. Because Plaintiff moved from that address, he did not receive the check. Because Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant resides in this district or that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to his claim arose in this district, venue is not proper in this Court under § 1391(b). Plaintiff’s claims arose in Brooklyn, New York, which is in the Eastern District of New York. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 112(c). Accordingly, venue lies in the Eastern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), and this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is further directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes this case.

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an

¹ In a state with multiple districts, if there is no such district, “the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most significant contacts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).

appeal. *Cf. Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 16, 2021
New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge